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IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Petitioner, 
vs. 
DANIEL J. PETERSON, 
Defendant/Respondent. 
Case No. 20030802-SC 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
5j£ Sft J}C JjC 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This case is before the Court on a writ of certiorari to the Utah Court of Appeals. 
This Court has jurisdiction under Utah Code Annotated § 78-2-2(3)(a) & -2(5). 
ISSUE PRESENTED AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Whether the Utah Court of Appeals correctly applied the well established Terry 
Frisk Doctrine in concluding that once the circumstances that justify a limited Terry frisk 
are no longer present, any further search violates Fourth Amendment safeguards? 
On certiorari, this Court reviews "the decision of the court of appeals, not the 
decision of the trial court." State v. Harmon, 910 P.2d 1196, 1199 (Utah 1995). The 
court of appeals' decision is reviewed for correctness. State v. James, 2000 UT 80, ^ f 8, 
13 P.3d 576. "The correctness of the court of appeals' decision turns on whether that 
court accurately reviewed the trial court's decision under the appropriate st^indgrd.of 
review." State v. Visser, 2000 UT 88 , \ 9, 22 P.3d 1242. 
CONTROLLING STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
United States Constitution, Amendment IV 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against 
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but 
upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the 
place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Daniel Peterson, was charged with possession or use of methamphetamine in a 
drug-free zone, a second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Annotated § 58-37-
8(2)(a)(i); and possession of drug paraphernalia in a drug-free zone, a class A 
misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Annotated § 58-37a-5(a) (R. 6-7). 
On January 18, 2002, Peterson moved to suppress the evidence on ground that the 
search of his personal property constituted an illegal warrantless search under the Fourth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution (R. 24-30). On January 24, 2002, a 
suppression hearing was held before Judge Taylor (R. 85, 210). At the close of the 
hearing, Judge Traylor denied the motion concluding that the search of Peterson's coat 
was justified as a Terry frisk (R. 210: 52, 54). On January 25, 2002, Peterson filed a 
motion to reconsider the ruling denying his motion to suppress (R. 118-22). 
On January 25, 2002, Peterson filed a Motion to Submit Judgment on Warrantless 
Search of Shoes asserting that while the trial court "previously held that the search of Mr. 
Peterson's coat was justified by the warrant exception articulated in Terry v. Ohio, 392 
U.S. 1 (1968),... no finding or ruling was made as to the warrantless search of Mr. 
Peterson's shoes" (R. 107). 
Thereafter, Peterson was tried by a jury and convicted of possession of drug-
paraphernalia in a drug free zone, a class A misdemeanor, and the lesser-included charge 
of possession/use of methamphetamine, a third degree felony (R. 126, 129, 212: 204). 
On March 27, 2002, Peterson was sentenced to concurrent terms of 0-1 years and 0-5 
years at the Utah State Prison (R. 193-94, 211). 
Peterson filed a timely notice of appeal (R. 198). On direct appeal, the Court of 
Appeals reversed. State v. Peterson, 2003 UT App 300, ^13, 77 P.3d 646. 
STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS1 
On December 28, 2001, Officer Russ Billings of the Provo City Police Department 
received an anonymous report that adults were using methamphetamine in the presence 
of children at a Provo residence (R. 205: 6; 212: 105-08). Officer Billings, along with 
several other officers, went to the residence to perform a welfare check on the children 
(R. 205: 6, 20). A woman answered the door and informed Officer Billings that her adult 
daughter, Dawn Webster, was the tenant (R. 205: 7, 12). Webster came to the door 
shortly thereafter and, according to Officer Billings, gave consent to the officers' entry 
and search of her apartment (R. 205: 7-8; 212: 108). 
Officer Billings proceeded with Webster to a bedroom, upstairs and down a short 
hallway, where Webster's baby was sleeping (R. 210: 5; 212: 109). Webster and Officer 
1
 The facts arc taken ^ rrcf]y from the court of nppr\n^ drchton in Vtalp v P^te^on, 2003 UT App.300, f!>3~67 
Billings had been in the bedroom for approximately three or five seconds when Peterson 
unexpectedly emerged from the closet wearing light clothing and no shoes (R. 205: 7-8; 
210: 6, 8, 9, 15-16; 212: 109-110, 156). Webster screamed out to her mother asking what 
the mother's boyfriend was doing in Webster's bedroom (R. 205: 33). Startled by 
Peterson's emergence from the closet, Officer Billings stepped back and ordered Peterson 
to stop, turn around, and place his hands where the officer could see them (R. 205: 8; 
210: 9-10). Peterson complied and Officer Billings then handcuffed him and patted him 
down for weapons (R. 205: 8; 210: 10, 17; 212: 138). Finding no weapons, Officer 
Billings asked another officer to escort Peterson outside (R. 205: 9-10; 210: 10, 17; 212: 
38). 
Within about sixty seconds of the pat-down, Officer Billings noticed a coat on the 
floor of the closet where Peterson had been standing (R. 212: 11, 138). Officer Billings 
asked a child who had entered the bedroom if the coat belonged to Peterson (R. 205: 9, 
17, 212). The child responded affirmatively (R. 210: 11, 13). Webster confirmed that the 
coat belonged to Peterson, and that Peterson had been wearing it when she answered the 
door (R. 205: 9, 17). Officer Billings picked up the coat, intending to take it to Peterson 
(R. 210: 15; 212: 31, 112). For safety purposes, he patted down the pockets of the coat 
(R. 205: 9). In doing so, Officer Billings felt a syringe in the right pocket (R. 210: 11; 
212: 12). Officer Billings removed the syringe, which contained a brown liquid that later 
tested positive for methamphetamine (R. 205: 10). Meanwhile, another officer picked up 
a pair of shoes within three feet of the closet (R. 212: 166). Inside one of the shoes, the 
officer found a baggy full of syringes (R. 205: 9, 26-27; 212: 118-19, 166-67). Once the 
syringes were removed from Peterson's coat and shoes, Officer Billings took the items to 
Peterson who, by then, was standing on the front porch in the "extremely cold" December 
weather (R 205: 13; 212: 131-32). Peterson was then arrested for drug offenses (R. 205: 
24). 
Before trial, Peterson moved to suppress all evidence found in his coat and shoes, 
claiming it was obtained by an illegal search and seizure (R. 24-30). The trial court 
denied Peterson's motion to suppress, finding that the search of the coat and shoes was 
within the scope of a lawful Terry frisk (R. 210: 52, 54). Peterson was subsequently 
convicted of possession of methamphetamine and paraphernalia. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The Court of Appeals correctly applied the Terry frisk doctrine to the facts of this 
case and accurately concluded that once the circumstances that justified the original pat-
down were no longer present, the officer exceeded the scope of the lawful frisk by 
subsequently searching the coat lying on the floor. 
The facts of this case clearly display that Peterson posed no danger or threat to 
Officer Billings or any other person when the coat was searched. Officer Billings had 
Peterson placed in handcuffs and escorted outside and Peterson remained outside under 
the supervision of another officer. At this point, it was impossible for Peterson to gain 
access to any weapon. 
And if there was any need for Peterson to wear a coat, it was due to the fact that 
Officer Billings created the need to search the coat by forcing Peterson outside and then 
handing him his coat. This Court has made it clear that officers cannot create the exigent 
circumstance in order to justify a warrantless search. 
Accordingly, the Court of Appeals correctly determined that the subsequent search 
was an unlawful Terry frisk violating the Fourth Amendment. 
ARGUMENT 
L THE FOURTH AMENDMENT PREVENTS POLICE OFFICERS 
FROM CREATING AN EXIGENCY IN ORDER TO JUSTIFY A 
TERRY SEARCH WHEN THE SUSPECT NO LONGER POSES A 
THREAT TO THE OFFICERS' SAFETY 
The Court of Appeals correctly found that once Peterson was handcuffed and 
escorted outside, "[fjhere then remained no reasonable expectation or apprehension that 
Peterson could access a weapon" which would pose a threat to the officers at the scene. 
State v. Peterson, 2003 UT App 300, f 13, 77 P.3d 646. Accordingly, the Court of 
Appeals correctly held that the subsequent search of Peterson's coat exceeded the scope 
of the Terry frisk. Id. Additionally, Peterson asserts that police officers cannot create the 
exigency in order to justify a warrantless search. Thus, the Court of Appeals' decision 
can be upheld on the grounds that Officer Billings exceeded the scope of the original 
Terry frisk or that officers cannot create the exigent circumstance in order to justify a 
warrantless search. 
A. The Subsequent Search of the Coat Exceeded the Lawful Frisk. 
The State agrees that the question before this Court is whether Officer Billings' 
search of the coat "was reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified 
the interference in the first place." State v. Lafond, 2003 UT App 101, ffi[ 11-12, 68 P.3d 
1043; see also Terry v. Ohio, 393 U.S. 1, 20, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968); (Br. 
of Pet. at 9). However, the State misconstrues Terry and its progeny by comparing the 
facts of this case to automobile stops and with the particular dangers that traffic stops 
pose to police officers when they already have reasonable, articulable suspicion that the 
suspect is armed and dangerous (Br. of Petitioner at 10). 
Thus, the State misinterprets the Terry doctrine and its application. The United 
States Supreme Court observed in Terry that "a search which is reasonable at its 
inception may violate the Fourth Amendment by virtue of its intolerable intensity and 
scope." Terry, 392 U.S. at 18-19, 88 S.Ct at 1878. Moreover, officers may not pursue a 
line of investigation not "reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified 
the interference in the first place." Lafond, 2003 UT App at ^ 12. Thus, once officers 
apprehend a suspect pursuant to reasonable suspicion, they may frisk the suspect in order 
to dispel or confirm whether the suspect is carrying a weapon, but once that 
determination has been made, a further search is beyond the scope of the initial frisk. See 
generally Terry, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868. 
To support its misplaced claim, the State first cites to Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 
1032, 1047, 103 S.Ct. 3469, 77L.Ed.2d 1201 (1983). In Long, officers stopped the 
defendant after they observed him driving erratically and at excessive speed. Id. at 1035. 
Long met the officers at the rear of his vehicle. Id. After repeated requests to produce his 
license, Long turned from the officers and approached the open door of his car. Id. at 
1(R6. Both officers followed Long and then observed a lonp^  hunting knife in the 
floorboard of his car. Id. The officers then stopped Long and subjected him to a Terry 
frisk, which revealed no weapons. One officer looked into the car with a flashlight and 
noticed something protruding from the front seat. Id. The purpose of the search was "to 
search for other weapons." Id. The officer then entered the car and while searching 
under the seat, he noticed a pouch on the front seat that contained marijuana. Id. Long 
was subsequently convicted of marijuana possession. Id. 
Long claimed on appeal that the Terry frisk was invalid because it was a search of 
an area rather than his person. Long, 463 U.S. at 1045. The United States Supreme 
Court rejected this claim on the grounds that police can conduct protective searches when 
they have a reasonable belief that the suspect poses a danger to them that arises "from the 
possible presence of weapons in the area surrounding the suspect." Id. at 1049. 
The Court observed that situations involving suspects slopped in vehicles are 
particularly dangerous to officers. Long, 463 U.S. at 1047. The Court noted that 
"investigative detentions involving suspects in vehicles are especially fraught with danger 
to police officers.... [considering the] inordinate risk confronting an officer as he 
approaches a person seated in an automobile." Id. at 1047-48 (citation omitted). To 
support this position, the Court stated that approximately 30% of police shootings occur 
when an officer is approaching a suspect seated in an automobile. Id. at 1048, n. 13. 
Citing to Chimel v California, 395 U.S. 752, 89 S.Ct. 2034, 23 L.Ed.2d 685 
(1969), the Court noted that "when an arrest is made, it is reasonable for the arresting 
officer to search 'the arrestee's person and the area within his immediate control.'" Long, 
463 U.S. at 1048. Under the principals set forth in Terry and its progeny, the Court then 
concluded: 
Our past cases indicate then that protection of police and others can justify 
protective searches when police have a reasonable belief that the suspect poses a 
danger, that roadside encounters between police and suspects are especially 
hazardous, and that danger may arise from the possible presence of weapons in the 
area surrounding a suspect. These principles compel our conclusion that the search 
of the passenger compartment of an automobile, limited to those areas in which a 
weapon may be placed or hidden, is permissible if the police officer possesses a 
reasonable belief based on "specific and articulable facts which, taken together 
with the rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant" the officers in 
believing that the suspect is dangerous and the suspect may gain immediate 
control of weapons. 
Id. at 1049 (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 21). 
The Supreme Court further concluded that the officers in Long were "reasonable 
[in their] belief that Long posed a danger if he were permitted to reenter his vehicle" 
since he would have access to possible weapons inside. Long, 463 U.S. at 1050. This 
conclusion was based on the fact that because Long was not handcuffed, he might "break 
away from police control and retrieve a weapon from his automobile." Id. at 105 L "Or," 
the Court stated, "the suspect may be permitted to reenter the vehicle before the Terry 
investigation is over, and again, may have access to weapons." Id. at 1052. In any event, 
the Supreme Court "stress[ed]" that such a warrantless search is allowed only because 
"the officer remains particularly vulnerable in part because a full custodial arrest has not 
been effected." Id. (emphasis in original). 
Thus, the police had reason to believe that Long was armed and dangerous, and if 
they did not search the vehicle, he might immediately obtain a weapon since he was not 
yet handcuffed. See Long, 463 U.S. at 1035,1052.
 w 
The fact that officers can search the grab area of a lawfully stopped vehicle, if they 
have reasonable suspicion that the suspect is armed, is not analogous to this case. Terry 
and its progeny explicitly allow police officers to conduct limited searches when a 
suspect may be able to gain immediate access to a weapon, such as the circumstances 
found in Long. However, once the suspect is in full custody and the suspect is no longer 
able to exercise any control over a weapon, any continuing search exceeds the scope of 
the original Terry frisk. See Long, 463 U.S. at 1052. 
Long is certainly not analogous to the facts of this case. For one, Officer Billings 
had no specific and articulable facts to believe that Peterson was able to gain immediate 
control of any weapons. Officer Billings admitted that there was nothing about the coat 
or the surrounding circumstances that caused him to believe that there might be a weapon 
in the coat (R. 210: 20). Moreover, Officer Billings admitted that he was not concerned 
for his safety regarding the coat unless-or until—the coat was handed to Peterson outside 
the residence (R. 210: 22). Furthermore, Peterson was handcuffed and placed outside the 
residence in the presence of another officer, and thus was in full police custody (R. 210: 
21). It would have been impossible for Peterson to "break away from police control and 
retrieve a weapon from his [coat]." See Long, 463 U.S. at 1051. Accordingly, the Court 
of Appeals correctly held that when "Officer Billings picked up the coat and patted it 
down for weapons, he exceeded the scope of the lawful frisk." Peterson, 2003 UT App at 
1113. 
The State further claims that Terry and its progeny have extended weapons frisks 
to,, "among other things, a diaper bag, jacket, duffel bag, motel room, knapsack, and 
paper bag." (Br. of Petitioner at 11). However, a quick review of these cases also reveals 
that they are not analogous to the facts in this case. See, e.g., State v. Harrison, 805 P.2d 
769 (Utah App. 1991) (murder suspect arrested and diaper bag nearby was subsequently 
searched as a search incident to arrest, revealing the murder weapon); State v. Vasqeuz, 
807 P.2d 520, 523 (Ariz. 1991) (officer called to scene of domestic dispute searched 
suspects jacket after suspect asked for it and officer told suspect he would have to search 
the jacket and suspect did not object); Servis v. Commonwealth, 371 S.E.2d 156, 160-61 
(Va. App. 1988) ( search of suspect's motel room justified by exigent circumstances and 
officer's reasonable belief that suspect was reported armed burglar); Jordan v. State, 531 
A.2d 1028, 1031-32 (Md. App. 1987) (officer justified in searching suspects bag after 
reasonable belief that weapon was in bag and suspect was looking in bag); State v. Ortiz, 
683 P.2d 822, 828 (Haw. 1984) (officer had reasonable suspicion that knapsack had a gun 
in it and officer took knapsack from suspect); United States v. Johnson, 637 F.2d 532, 
534-35 (8th Cir. 1980) (officer searched suspect's duffel bag that the suspect was holding 
after reasonable belief that it contained a gun); People v. Bowles, 289 N.Y.S.2d 526, 528 
(1968) (pre-dating Terry by three months) (officer knew in advance that defendant had a 
razor in his pants and accordingly conducted a 'frisk' of the pants that were on the floor). 
None of these cases are analogous to the facts of this case since the officers in 
each of these cases had specific, articulable suspicion that the suspects had immediate 
access to or control of a weapon. Just the opposite is true in this case. After Peterson 
was handcuffed and escorted outside the residence, any specific, articulable suspicion 
that may have existed was quickly abated once he was in the full custody of the other 
officer. Peterson never asked Officer Billings to hand him the coat (R. 210: 20); see 
Vasqeuz, 807 P.2d at 523. Nor was there any suspicion that Peterson had been engaged 
in a dangerous crime or that there was a dangerous weapon at the scene. Thus, Officer 
Billings' warrantless search exceeded the scope of the lawful frisk. 
B. Police Cannot Create the Exigency To Justify A Warrantless Search 
Next, the State incorrectly claims that this case presents circumstances where "the 
officer might 'reasonably suspect the possibility of harm if he returns [property] 
unexamined."5 (Br. of Petitioner at 11). While there may be situations where it would be 
unwise to return property to a suspect, Peterson asserts that police officers cannot create 
the exigent circumstance in order to search any item they please. 
Controlling authority is clear that police cannot create the exigent circumstance in 
order to justify a warrantless search. See State v Beavers, 859 P.2d 9, 18 (Utah App. 
1993). While the State claims that the Court of Appeals' ruling forces police officers to 
choose between leaving Peterson outside with no coat or giving him a coat that may 
contain a weapon, such is not the case under these facts (Br. of Petitioner at 8-9). Here, 
Officer Billings had Peterson removed from the residence in handcuffs. Once Peterson 
was outside, Officer Billings had no reason to believe that he was a threat to him or 
anyone else. It was the officer's decision to place Peterson outside in the cold weather. 
Peterson did not request anything from the officer (R. 210: 20). If there was any need for 
Peterson to wear a coat, it was due to the fact that Officer Billings created the need to 
search the coat by forcing Peterson outside and then handing him his coat. 
Under the State's theory, police would be allowed to exceed the scope of a lawful 
Terry frisk after they have already determined a suspect is no longer armed or dangerous 
by simply removing the suspect from the premises and then handing the suspect any item 
they want searched. The police would only need to claim a need to hand the suspect the 
item and then a need to search the item in order to protect themselves, effectively creating 
the exigency for the warrantless search. 
The State's argument misunderstands the fundamental protections the Fourth 
Amendment provides. Although the State accurately portrays that any warrantless search 
must be scrutinized against "the reasonableness in all the circumstances of the particular 
governmental invasion of a citizen's personal security," the State then advocates a 
position that violates Fourth Amendment protections by allowing officers to exceed the 
scope of lawful frisks once the circumstances that justify the frisk are no longer present 
(Br. of Petitioner at 14; quoting State v. Warren, 2003 UT 36, If 31, 78 P.3d 590). To 
allow government agents to continue searching once the circumstances that justify the 
search are no longer present or to create the exigent circumstance that would allow a 
suspect to gain control of a possibly dangerous weapon violates the Fourth Amendment. 
But this is exactly the position the State is supporting and this is why the Court of 
Appeals' decision correctly balances the competing interests of officer safety and 
personal privacy. 
The State is rightly concerned about ongoing officer safety and the Court of 
Appeals' decision in no way risks an officer's safety. The decision adequately 
considered Officer Billings' safety in this matter and correctly concluded that once 
Peterson was handcuffed and escorted outside, "there then remained no reasonable 
expectation or apprehension that Peterson could access a weapon." Peterson, 2003 UT 
App at f^ 13. Moreover, Officer Billings cannot create the exigent circumstance by 
removing Peterson outside in the cold and then claim the need to conduct further searches 
in order to protect himself (R. 210: 53). 
Peterson asserts that the Court of Appeals' analysis of the Terry doctrine applied 
to the facts of this case provides a well reasoned opinion that balances Fourth 
Amendment protections with an officer's safety and accordingly, this Court should 
uphold that decision. 
CONCLUSION AND PRECISE RELIEF SOUGHT 
For the reasons set forth above, Peterson asks this Court to affirm the Court of 
Appeals' decision. 
c 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this A _ day of August, 2004. 
&, Margaret r. Lindsay 
Counsel for Appellant 
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Court of Appeals of Utah. 
STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and Appellee, 
v. 
Daniel J. PETERSON, Defendant and Appellant. 
No. 20020341-CA. 
Sept 5, 2003. 
Defendant was convicted in the Fourth District 
Court, Provo Department, R. Taylor, J., possession 
of methamphetamine, and possession of 
paraphernalia in a drug-free zone. Defendant 
appealed. The Court of Appeals, Bench, J., held 
that search of defendant's coat and shoes exceeded 
the scope of an otherwise justified Terry frisk. 
Reversed. 
West Headnotes 
|1J Criminal Law €^1134(3) 
1 lOkl 134(3) Most Cited Cases 
[1] Criminal Law €^H53(1) 
1 lOkl 153(1) Most Cited Cases 
[1] Criminal Law €^>l 158(4) 
1 lOkl 158(4) Most Cited Cases 
Factual findings underlying a trial court's decision 
to grant or deny a motion to suppress evidence are 
reviewed under the deferential clearly-erroneous 
standard, and the legal conclusions are reviewed for 
correctness, with a measure of discretion given to 
the trial judge's application of the legal standard to 
the facts. 
12] Arrest €^>63.5(9) 
35k63.5(9) Most Cited Cases 
Search of coat and shoes of defendant, who was 
Page 1 
convicted of possession of methamphetamine and 
possession of paraphernalia in a drug-free zone, 
exceeded the scope of an otherwise justified Terry 
frisk; after defendant had been frisked and removed 
from premises, circumstances that justified 
pat-down, namely search for weapons, were no 
longer present when officer searched coat that was 
lying on floor, and thus, when officer picked up 
coat and patted it down for weapons, he exceeded 
the scope of the lawful frisk. U.S.C.A. 
Const.Amend. 4; U.C.A.1953, 58-37-8.. 
|3) Searches and Seizures €^>23 
349k23 Most Cited Cases 
The Fourth Amendment of the United States 
Constitution guarantees the right of people to be 
secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, 
against unreasonable searches and seizures; 
however, what the Constitution forbids is not all 
searches and seizures, but unreasonable searches 
and seizures. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4. 
|4] Arrest €^>63.5(8) 
35k63.5(8) Most Cited Cases 
When an officer is justified in believing that an 
individual whose suspicious behavior he is 
investigating at close range is armed and presently 
dangerous to the officer or to others, the officer may 
conduct a pat-down or frisk to determine whether 
the person is in fact carrying a weapon; however, 
such search must be strictly limited to that which is 
necessary for the discovery of weapons which might 
be used to harm the officer or others nearby. 
U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4. 
[5] Arrest €^>63.5(8) 
35k63.5(8) Most Cited Cases 
In determining what is reasonable during a 
pat-down search or frisk, an appellate court must 
ask first whether officer's action was justified at its 
inception, and second, whether it was reasonably 
related in scope to the circumstances which justified 
the interference in the first place. U.S.C.A. 
Copr. © West 2004 No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works 
77 P.3d 646 
77 P.3d 646, 481 Utah Adv. Rep. 3, 2003 UT App 300 
(Cite as: 77 P.3d 646) 
Const.Amend. 4. 
*646 Margaret P. Lindsay, Aldrich Nelson 
Wreight & Esplin, Provo, for Appellant. 
Mark L. Shurtleff, Attorney Generals Office and 
Marian Decker, Assistant Attorney General, Salt 
Lake City, for Appellee. 
Before Judges BENCH, DAVIS, and 
GREENWOOD. 
OPINION 
BENCH, Judge. 
f 1 Peterson appeals his convictions for 
possession of methamphetamine, a third degree 
felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 
58-37-8(2)(a)(i), (4)(a), (c) (1998 & Supp.2002), 
and possession of paraphernalia in a drug-free zone, 
a class A misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code 
Ann. §§ 58-37a-5 and 58-37-8(4)(a), (c) (1998 & 
Supp.2002). On appeal, Peterson claims that the 
search of his coat and shoes exceeded the scope of 
an otherwise justified Terry frisk. See *647Terry v. 
Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 
(1968). We agree. We therefore reverse his 
convictions. 
BACKGROUND 
f 2 The facts of this case are recited in the light 
most favorable to the trial court's findings from the 
suppression hearing. See State v. Delaney, 869 P.2d 
4, 5 (Utah Ct.App. 1994). 
1 3 On December 28, 2001, Officer Russ Billings 
of the Provo City Police Department received an 
anonymous report that adults were using 
methamphetamine in the presence of children at a 
Provo residence. Officer Billings, along with 
several other officers, went to the residence to 
perform a welfare check on the children. A woman 
answered the door and informed Officer Billings 
that her adult daughter, Dawn Webster, was the 
tenant. Webster came to the door shortly thereafter 
and, according to Officer Billings, gave consent to 
the officers' entry and search of her apartment. 
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1 4 Officer Billings proceeded with Webster to a 
bedroom, upstairs and down a short hallway, where 
Webster's baby was sleeping. Webster and Officer 
Billings had been in the bedroom for approximately 
three or five seconds when Peterson unexpectedly 
emerged from the closet wearing light clothing and 
no shoes. Webster screamed out to her mother 
asking what the mother's boyfriend was doing in 
Webster's bedroom. [FN1] Startled by Peterson's 
emergence from the closet, Officer Billings stepped 
back and ordered Peterson to stop, turn around, and 
place his hands where the officer could see them. 
Peterson complied and Officer Billings then 
handcuffed him and patted him down for weapons. 
Finding no weapons, Officer Billings asked another 
officer to escort Peterson outside. 
FN1. Webster knew Peterson was in the 
apartment, but thought he was in the 
kitchen with her mother. 
\ 5 Within about sixty seconds of the pat-down, 
Officer Billings noticed a coat on the floor of the 
closet where Peterson had been standing. Officer 
Billings asked a child who had entered the bedroom 
if the coat belonged to Peterson. The child 
responded affirmatively. Webster confirmed that 
the coat belonged to Peterson, and that Peterson had 
been wearing it when she answered the door. 
Officer Billings picked up the coat, intending to 
take it to Peterson. For safety purposes, he patted 
down the pockets of the coat. In doing so, Officer 
Billings felt a syringe in the right pocket. Officer 
Billings removed the syringe, which contained a 
brown liquid that later tested positive for 
methamphetamine. Meanwhile, another officer 
picked up a pair of shoes within three feet of the 
closet. Inside one of the shoes, the officer found a 
baggy full of syringes. Once the syringes were 
removed from Peterson's coat and shoes, Officer 
Billings took the items to Peterson who, by then, 
was standing on the front porch in the "extremely 
cold" December weather. Peterson was then 
arrested for drug offenses. 
\ 6 Before trial, Peterson moved to suppress all 
evidence found in his coat and shoes, claiming it 
was obtained by an illegal search and seizure. The 
trial court denied Peterson's motion to suppress, 
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finding that the search of the coat and shoes was 
within the scope of a lawful Terry frisk. Peterson 
was subsequently convicted of possession of 
methamphetamine and paraphernalia. Peterson 
appeals. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
[1] f 7 "The factual findings underlying a trial 
court's decision to grant or deny a motion to 
suppress evidence are reviewed under the 
deferential clearly-erroneous standard, and the legal 
conclusions are reviewed for correctness, with a 
measure of discretion given to the trial judge's 
application of the legal standard to the facts." State 
v. Moreno, 910 P.2d 1245, 1247 (Utah 
Ct.App.1996). 
ANALYSIS 
[2][3] 1f 8 "The Fourth Amendment of the United 
States Constitution guarantees the 'right of the 
people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, 
and effects, against unreasonable searches and 
seizures.' " State v. Lopez, 873 P.2d 1127, 1131 
(Utah 1994) *648 (quoting U.S. Const, amend. IV). 
However, "what the Constitution forbids is not all 
searches and seizures, but unreasonable searches 
and seizures." Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 9, 88 
S.Ct. 1868, 1873, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968) 
(quotations and citation omitted). 
[4] Tf 9 "When an officer is justified in believing 
that the individual whose suspicious behavior he is 
inve'stigating at close range is armed and presently 
dangerous to the officer or to others," the officer 
may conduct a pat-down or frisk "to determine 
whether the person is in fact carrying a weapon." 
Terry, 392 U.S. at 24, 88 S.Ct. 1868. However, 
such search must be strictly "limited to that which is 
necessary for the discovery of weapons which might 
be used to harm the officer or others nearby." Id. at 
26, 88 S.Ct. 1868. Professor LaFave explains that 
"the limited search permitted by Terry, it is 
important to remember, is to find weapons" that 
might be used to assault the officer. Wayne R. 
LaFave, 4 Search & Seizure Law: A Treatise on the 
Fourth Amendment, § 9.5(b), at 274 (3d ed.1996). 
Utah courts have consistently upheld limited 
searches for weapons under Terry. In State v. 
Bradford, 839 P.2d 866 (Utah Ct.App.1992), we 
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stated that, under Terry, "when an officer 
reasonably believes a suspect is dangerous and may 
obtain immediate control of weapons, a protective 
search is justified." Id. at 870 (citation omitted). 
The Utah Supreme Court, in State v. Roybal, 716 
P.2d 291 (Utah 1986), held that an officer may 
conduct a protective weapons search only if "a 
reasonably prudent [person] in the circumstances 
would be warranted in the belief that his [or her] 
safety or that of others was in danger." Id. at 293 
(quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 27, 88 S.Ct. 1868). 
[5] Tf 10 In determining what is reasonable during 
a pat-down search or frisk, we must ask first 
"whether the officer's action was justified at its 
inception," and second, "whether it was reasonably 
related in scope to the circumstances which justified 
the interference in the first place." Terry, 392 U.S. 
at 20, 88 S.Ct. 1868. Peterson concedes that the 
frisk of his person was justified at its inception. 
Therefore, we limit our analysis to the scope of the 
search. 
Tf 11 The second prong of the Terry analysis asks 
whether the scope of the search was reasonably 
related to the circumstances that justified the 
interference. See id.; accord State v. Chapman, 
921 P.2d 446, 450 (Utah 1996); State v. Johnson, 
805 P.2d 761, 763 (Utah 1991). In other words, we 
must determine whether the subsequent action of 
searching the coat and shoes was within the scope 
of the frisk conducted on Peterson's person. 
f 12 Utah courts have addressed the issue of 
scope in different contexts. In Johnson, 805 P.2d at 
764, the Utah Supreme Court held that running a 
warrants check on a passenger in an automobile that 
had been properly stopped exceeded the appropriate 
scope of detention. Similarly, in State v. White, 856 
P.2d 656 (Utah Ct.App.1993), we held that the 
police officer exceeded the scope of a Terry frisk 
when the need for a frisk had dissipated. 
Furthermore, in State v. Valdez, 2003 UT App 100, 
68 P.3d 1052, we held that a police officer's request 
for a defendant's identification during the arrest of 
another person "exceeded the scope of the reasons 
justifying the initial detention and unnecessarily 
expanded its duration in scope." Id. at If 8. In fact, 
the scope of the detention was "limited to ensuring 
that defendant had no weapon in his hands and was 
in no position to violently interfere with the arrest." 
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Id. at f 22. 
K 13 As in Terry and the above cases, the 
authority and scope of a frisk for weapons carried 
out by Officer Billings must be "narrowly drawn." 
Terry, 392 U.S. at 27, 88 S.Ct. 1868. The facts of 
the present case are undisputed. After Officer 
Billings entered the room, Peterson suddenly 
emerged from the closet. Fearing for his own safety 
and the safety of others present, Officer Billings 
lawfully and justifiably conducted a pat-down of 
Peterson's person. After ensuring that Peterson did 
not have a weapon, Officer Billings asked another 
officer to escort Peterson outside. Peterson was 
then removed from the room and ultimately from 
the premises. There then remained no reasonable 
expectation or apprehension that Peterson could 
access a weapon or would otherwise interfere with 
the welfare check. The circumstances *649 that 
justified the pat-down, namely the search for 
weapons, were no longer present when Officer 
Billings searched the coat that was lying on the 
floor. Therefore, when Officer Billings picked up 
the coat and patted it down for weapons, he 
exceeded the scope of the lawful frisk. The 
evidence seized from the coat and shoes is therefore 
not admissible. 
CONCLUSION 
\ 14 We are persuaded that the search of 
Peterson's coat exceeded the scope of a Terry frisk. 
The safety and weapons concerns were no longer 
present after Peterson had been frisked and 
removed from the premises. We therefore reverse 
the convictions. 
t 15 WE CONCUR: JAMES Z. DAVIS and 
PAMELA T. GREENWOOD, Judges. 
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